Introduction
This book is both welcome and timely. I should say at the outset that it is a magnificent piece of scholarship, well worth reading by anyone with any degree of serious interest in the Italian neo-Idealists and Collingwood. I don't mean, of course that it is blemish-free or that one cannot disagree with parts of it; but I do mean that I know of nothing comparable which systematically draws together the thought of these thinkers and considers them in their mutual relations. 1 This book has been needed for decades. Following its publication, commentators on Collingwood and the Italian idealists no longer have any excuse for ignorance concerning the intellectual relationship between the thinkers it discusses.
The thought of Giovanni Gentile is returning, if not into fashion, at least into the world of serious discussion and attention. 2 Benedetto Croce has always found an audience over the years, although the location of that audience has moved around the disciplines somewhat. De Ruggiero has largely been forgotten, 1 Proof reading could have been better and there are a large number of typographical errors. But notice that even here he does not feel the need to name Croce, Gentile and De Ruggiero -there is no need to do so and, further, his point seems to be that it is not the input into his thinking that matter so much as the quality and character of the output. More generally we might add that it is unfair on any author to seek to reduce him or her to their 'influences'; Collingwood himself wrote perceptively of 'that frivolous and superficial type of history which speaks of 'influences' and 'borrowings' and so forth, and when it says that A is influenced by B or that A borrows from B never asks itself what there was in A that laid it open to B's influence, or what there was in A which made it capable of borrowing from B'. 7 I would suggest that the best image should be that of a dialogue in which thinkers are both created by their influences and also create those influences (or at least determines what those influences might be). It is the great merit of this book that Peters presents the relation between the four thinkers as an overlapping set of dialogues, not as a simple matter of influence and being influenced.
I have deliberately used the term 'colleagues'. There were, of course, influences; but there were also affinities, criticisms, rejections, and questions. In Collingwood's case I concur with Peters's remark that 'Italian philosophy raised many of Collingwood's questions, but his answers were definitely his own': but I would apply this comment to each philosopher. 8 In short, there was a vibrant intellectual relationship between the four thinkers discussed in this book, and such a relationship cannot be reduced to a single notion of influence or to the conflation of positions as we have so often seen in discussions in the philosophy 7 R. G. Collingwood This method of exposition makes for completeness and thoroughness; it also makes for constant cross-referencing on the part of the reader. It has to be admitted that Peters presents himself with a difficult task of exposition and exegesis: a four way relationship developing over time, with mutual interactions is not going to be easy to exhibit clearly and coherently. This is therefore a book not to be devoured in a single hungry sitting, with course following course from soup to nuts, but in several sittings in which mezes and tapas compete for attention as one moves back and forth between different dishes and builds them into a satisfactory meal. This is not to object to Peters's manner of proceeding, but merely to point out that he rightly understands that to do a proper job with the material it has to be presented in a complex cross-cutting fashion and the reader has to be prepared to consume it in Greek or Spanish style.
In the following discussion I make no attempt to provide a systematic account or critique of Peters's book; rather I shall draw attention to some features which strike me as of particular interest and also make some links to, and discuss, some topics in the philosophy of history to which Collingwood's contribution still remains to be properly appreciated or understood.
Collingwood and Guido De Ruggiero
The authors discussed by Peters were all in their own different but related ways seeking to show how different forms of experience are related to each other. This is why it is imperative to understand their thought on history in relation to their views on logic, metaphysics, aesthetics or ethics. In this sense they were all antipositivists, being interested in exploring the different forms of understanding in their own terms as well as in relation to each other, without a presumption that there was a single master discipline, natural science, purportedly providing the master blueprint for all forms of knowledge.
For me one of the considerable merits of the book is to show precisely how close Collingwood was to de Ruggiero. He obviously learnt much from Gentile and Croce, but with de Ruggiero there was a distinctive sense that they formed a duo in mutual learning and joint criticism of their elders, Croce and Gentile. Collingwood's thought resonated with de Ruggiero's insistence on the unity of the spirit in contrast to Croce who tended to emphasis the distinction of forms of experience and neglect their underlying unity or Gentile's tendency to resolve everything into the individual act of thinking, the pensiero pensante. Ruggiero's conclusion that there is no formal distinction between the forms of the spirit; art, religion, science, history, philosophy and action are all forms of self-conscious activity, or in his own terminology; all forms of the spirit are philosophical. 13 One of the besetting problems of Collingwood interpretation has been the lack of attention paid to his insistence on the unity of the spirit and, directly related, a failure to recognise the distinction between professions and forms of experience as constitutive of every person's conscious life. We are all artists, historians, scientists, historians and philosophers, and each activity is related to and feeds into each other; for example, we are artists in our use of imagery, language and expression or philosophers in so far as we become self critical and seek out the presuppositions of the forms of experience in which we engage. We might also happen to be professional artists, scientists or philosophers, but there is no flourishes in Italy, into other countries, and those who would hinder the spread of that philosophy which, I hold, is its basis. 18 The 'pedigree' of fascism was apparently impressive, going back to Vico and culminating in Croce, Gentile and Mussolini. Mussolini is treated both as politician and as philosopher: Lion firmly maintains the view, also attributed to Mussolini, that there was a clear connection between his politics and Italian Idealism and that 'he could not conceive how people could doubt that fact unless they were idiots.' 19 Her account of Mussolini and Fascism was enthusiastic, almost fanatical.
She wrote that 'If "Avanti" was not the motto of Socialism the Fascists could make it theirs; as it is, reintroducing faith and belief at the basis of man's life they seem to point to higher moral, political and economical conquests. The only motto that can befit the black shirts movement is therefore Sursum corda.' 20 Lion deserves to be taken seriously both because she had an influential readership, 21 and was also one of Collingwood's sources for his knowledge of fascism. She provided a direct line to Gentile and, ultimately, to Mussolini. On the one side were his friends Croce and de Ruggiero, staunch anti-fascists; on the other side Lion, who represented Mussolini as the embodiment of Gentile's philosophy. For her, Gentile's philosophy simply was the philosophy of Fascism:
in so far as he accepted this view, Collingwood was bound to have a very uneasy relationship with Gentile. Had he not believed in a strong relation between 18 The Pedigree of Fascism, 'Author's note'; she also thanks Smith, Collingwood and C.C.J. Webb for their help. 19 History. 27 Peters is right to emphasise the importance of both Human Nature and Human History, and Collingwood's participation in the production of Philosophy and History. His involvement with this festschrift was close, so close that at one point he complained that he was virtually editing it. After its publication he reviewed it for the English Historical Review. His review demonstrates exactly how close his thinking was to some of its central themes and how they formed What is indubitably historical is the life of the human mind; now, for Gentile, mind is the only reality, nature is only a construction of ideas, a product of human thought, existing and therefore developing with the development of the thought that constructs it. Nature, in the scientist's present conception of it, is not historical; but the scientist's present conception of it is only the stage now reached in the historical development of science, and thus not nature itself, but the reality (as Kant would have said, the thing in itself) underlying it, is historical, being in fact the scientist's thought. Time is transcended in history because the historian, in discovering the thoughts of a past agent, re-thinks that thought for himself. It is known, therefore, not as a past thought, contemplated as it were from a distance through the historian's time telescope, but as a present thought living now in the historian's mind. Thus, by being historically known, it undergoes a resurrection out of the limbo of the dead past, triumphs over time, and survives in the present. This is an important idea, and I believe a true one. Its importance for the historian lies in the fact that, so conceived, history is no longer a 'story of successive events': it is the actual possession by the historian, here and now, of the thought whose history he studies. And a past whose thought the historian is unable thus to make his own, whether through lack of evidence or through defect in his own mental powers, inability to sympathize with it, is a past at once dead and unknowable. This doctrine has a practical bearing on historical method. It implies that in order to understand a certain past event or state of society the historian must not only have sufficient documents at his disposal; he must also be, or make himself, the right kind of man; a man capable of entering into the minds of the person whose history he is studying. 29 These sentiments, which may be best described as Collingwood's creative reinterpretation of Gentile, are instructive when one considers the crystallisation of his thought on history as expressed in Human Nature and Human History and the sections on philosophy of history in An Autobiography which served as a summary account of his views prior to the posthumous publication of The Idea of History. These texts were perhaps the turning point in the development of Collingwood's mature philosophy of history.
In parallel with the arrival of the first drafts of the essays in Philosophy and History we find in Collingwood's Notes Towards a Metaphysics this intriguing passage:
Nature is the realm of change, Spirit is the realm of becoming. The life of the spirit is a history: i.e. not a process in which everything comes to be and passes away, but a process in which the past is conserved as an element in the present. The past is not merely a precondition of the present but a condition of it. Whereas in nature the past was necessary in order that the present may now exist … the past being thus left behind when the present comes into being, in history, so far as this is real history and not mere time-sequence, the past conserves itself in the present, and the present could not be there unless it did. Thus, if there is a history of thought, Newton's physics still stands as a necessary element in The past is, on this view, an abstraction from the present, which alone is actual; history is a projection of thought backwards in time, like a jet of water thrown backwards by some marine animal to push it forwards.
There is therefore no real development: only an eternal present, which does not enrich itself by taking up the past, but defecates a past out of 34 Collingwood, An Autobiography, pp. 110, 112, 113.
itself. This seems to me to be subjective idealism. It follows from the indifference of logical structure between fact and fact: since in everything that matters every fact is identical with every other, all presents are the same present, differing "merely empirically" i.e. not at all. The past being a mere abstraction from the present, past facts cannot be known in their concreteness, and there is no series of facts; there is no transition from one to another, nothing becomes, everything is in a timeless present.
Gentile seems to me to have concentrated his attention on the epistemological notion of the historian building up his history into the past and so forming his perspective of past time, but to have neglected the problem of the relation between perspectives; and each man's perspective is for him a subjective-idealist world, in which the object is not spirit (pensiero pensante) but idea (pensiero pensato). The problem of development, which had been pushed out of sight by Croce's polemic against Hegel, has been wholly overlooked by Gentile, with the result that Fascist thought, egocentric and subjective, can rightly be called by Croce antistoricismo. 35 Peters rightly sees that, first, Collingwood's philosophy hung together as a whole Alexander. In relation to the process philosophy of Alexander and Whitehead, he accepted their account of the physical world while at the same time denying the identity of change and historicity for reasons discussed above.
Here, it is worth interjecting here another facet of his distinction between the natural sciences and the historical sciences by considering his analysis of causation. This is not as well known as it should be in the philosophy of history.
Collingwood distinguishes three senses. In sense I, 'cause refers to the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent, and causing means providing a motive. In sense II, what is caused is an event in nature, and its 'cause is an event by producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be.' In sense III, what is caused is an event, and its cause is another event standing to it in a one-one relation of causal priority. 37 He goes on to state that: Sense I may be called the historical sense of the word 'cause', because it refers to a type of case in which both C and E are human activities such as form the subject-matter of history. When historians talk about causes, this 36 Peters, History as thought and Action, 342. 37 R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; second edition, with introduction and additional material, edited by R. Martin, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1998), 285-6. is the sense in which they are using the word, unless they are aping the methods and vocabulary of natural science. 38 Far from giving primacy to the use of the term in the physical sciences he asserts that this use is derivative from its use in history and the applied sciences such as medicine. Originally a cause was a reason for acting in a certain way; in medicine and other practical activity it refers to the ability or otherwise of ensuring or preventing something from happening. In physics he shows both that it is no longer presupposed and that it is incoherent. Collingwood had worked on refining this view of causation for ten or more years prior to publication, in parallel with both his metaphysical thought and his philosophy of history. Consider his injunction to 'focus on the writer's mental world, the world of his empirical beliefs. This rule derives from the logical connection between our capacity to ascribe intentions to agents and our knowledge of their beliefs.' 41 Further, he urges intellectual historians to conceive their basic task as 'trying so far as possible to think as our ancestors thought and to see things their way.
What this requires is that we should recover the concepts they possessed, the distinctions they drew and the chains of reasoning they followed in their attempts to make sense of their world. 42 Here I endorse Hyrkkänen's view that, 'here we are touching upon a conflict of interpretation of Collingwood's intentions … I take Skinner to mean, simply, that we have to be able to think how our ancestors thought by trying to see things their way. Collingwood would have said, simply, that we have to be able to re-enact what they thought.' Re-enactment means envisaging the situation: it is hard to see wherein the difference lies between this and Skinner's expression 'seeing things their way'. And he expresses his puzzlement by commenting that: re-enactment is, however, a term Skinner refuses to employ and, accordingly, an act he refuses to perform, because he takes re-enactment to mean that historians should, for instance, "re-enact or re-create the experience of being sixteenth-century demonologists or peasants of So why did Skinner not use the idea of re-enactment? Is it because of the intuitionism he saw in it? Or because he took it to entail re-enacting both meaning and also feelings and emotions? Or is it because he saw it as some sort of special method which avoided the need for historical evidence? 48 We have seen that Skinner rejects the doctrine of re-enactment and yet in his positive characterisation of historical method steers indistinguishably close to it. Further, in various places he refers favourably to the very passages in which Collingwood develops the theory. This can perhaps be explained by considering two issues in the way re-enactment is interpreted and understood. The first is the theory of mind it presupposes; the second is whether it is characterised as condition of the possibility of historical knowledge or as a method to be for gaining historical knowledge. On the first point, Skinner rejects the theory because of what he sees as its reliance on intuition. He rejects the view of mind he (falsely) supposes Collingwood to hold and does this by aligning Collingwood with the verstehen tradition. On the second, his approach tends to emphasise the importance of reconstructing the problem situation facing an author/actor intervening in a debate at a particular time and place. This appears to be reenactment in its methodological interpretation. I would argue that there is, Collingwood, a distinction between re-enactment as an epistemological claim in which, if the historical reconstruction of an historian is successful, there is success in rethinking the thought of a past historical agent; and there is reenactment as a heuristic device, ranging from the injunction to try to put oneself in someone's place and see the situation through their eyes, 49 through to the 48 As though a working archaeologist was ever likely to suggest such a thing. 49 See, for example, the passages on Nelson and sea battles in An Autobiography, 58, 112-13.
importance of ascertaining the complex of question, answer and presupposition, which informed the thought of the historical agent. Skinner accepts the latter while denying the former, and this is a plausible and coherent position: but it is certainly accepting at least one aspect of re-enactment. But why does he deny the former?
My answer is this: he converges on re-enactment without approaching what he sees as its contentious elements and yoking himself to the term, and he signifies his limitation of sympathy with it both by not using the term and also by explicitly denying it. It is an asymptotic convergence but, approaching it as he does, he never has to accept the label of re-enactment. It is as though if he is led to water too quickly he cannot re-think; but that if gradually led to water he does re-think. The reason he rejects it in this form is because he sees himself as faced with a) a method which b) captures intuitively or in an occult fashion the thoughts of past agents independently of evidence, based c) on a Cartesian or dualist theory of mind. Faced with such a prospect, Skinner rightly recoils, because if this was Collingwood's view it should not be accepted.
Conclusion
How much of Peters's account is of value to contemporary philosophy of history?
The short answer is that there is considerable value. The details of the story often turn on matters of important principle concerning methods, interpretation, re-enactment, the living past, the nature of mind, the different forms of experience by which we cognise the world, and so on. These are still live issues.
So any serious discussion of them, never mind that it is conducted within the guise of a discussion of differences affinities and influences between philosophers writing nearly a century ago, retains and will retain its interest.
What audience, is the book addressed to? My answer is a far wider readership than perhaps knows it. To understand the philosophy of the early twentieth century one needs to know something of Italian neo-idealism, and to follow debates in the philosophy of history one needs to understand Collingwood's thought which in turn requires an understanding of Italian neo-idealism. This book is an ideal compendium for this readership: to misappropriate one of Hegel's favourite dictums: here is the text, dance thou here.
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